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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the analysis of technological change by cliometricians. It
focuses on lessons about total factor productivity (TFP) from growth accounting
and on aspects of social capability that are conducive to the effective assimilation
of new technology. Keymessages are that when TFP growth is very rapid this typi-
cally involves reductions in inefficiency not just technological advance and that
even really important new technologies have small initial effects on aggregate pro-
ductivity. Incentive structures matter greatly for the adoption of new technology,
but social capability is not independent of the technological epoch as the informa-
tion and communications technology (ICT) era has emphasized to Europeans.
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RESUMEN
Este artı´culo revisa el ana´lisis del cambio tecnolo´gico por clio´metras. Se
centra en las lecciones acerca de la productividad total de los factores (PTF)
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desde la contabilidad del crecimiento y sobre aspectos de la capacidad social
que propician la asimilacio´n efectiva de nueva tecnologı´a. Los mensajes clave
son que, cuando el crecimiento de la PTF es muy ra´pido, esto normalmente
implica reducciones en ineficiencia no so´lo avance en el cambio te´cnico y que
incluso las nuevas tecnologı´as realmente importantes tienen efectos iniciales
pequen˜os sobre la productividad agregada. Las estructuras de incentivos son
realmente importantes en la adopcio´n de nuevas tecnologı´as pero la capacidad
social no es independiente del periodo tecnolo´gico, como la era de las tecno-
logı´as de la informacio´n y Comunicacio´n (TIC) muestran para los europeos.
Palabras clave: crecimiento econo´mico, contabilidad del crecimiento,
capacidad social, cambio tecnolo´gico
1. INTRODUCTION
Technological change is central to the study of economic history. Strong
and sustained technological progress is the key characteristic of modern
economic growth that distinguished the post-Industrial Revolution world
from earlier times and is the fundamental force that has raised living standards
over the past 250 years. As Paul Romer said, «Our knowledge of economic
history, of what production looked like 100 years ago, and of current events
convinces us beyond any doubt that discovery, invention and innovation are of
overwhelming importance in economic growth» (1993, p. 562).
Accordingly, quantitative economic historians have devoted a great deal of
effort to the analysis of technological change. This has resulted in a large body
of evidence that in some ways complements that which can be drawn from the
economics literature and which, to an extent, suggests that the conventional
wisdom of economists needs to be modified. The difference in perspective stems
from the range of experience, which is provided by economic history and from a
focus on explaining the evolution of economies over time. This paper highlights
some findings that are well-known to those economic historians who study
long-run economic growth but deserve a wider audience.
The exposition is organized by addressing two questions that relate,
respectively, to what are sometimes called the «proximate» and the «ultimate»
sources of economic growth. These questions are:
> What have we learnt from historical growth accounting about the role
of total factor productivity (TFP) growth?
> When do countries exploit well the opportunities of new technology?
A review of some results from growth accounting and how to interpret
them is highly appropriate since this represents the most important techni-
que for quantifying the impact of new technology on productivity. A look at
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what Abramovitz and David (1996) called «social capability» and «techno-
logical congruence» allows an emphasis on some of the distinctive flavour
of what economic history has to say about success and failure in growth
performance, perhaps the most important topic in the discipline.
2. LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL GROWTH ACCOUNTING
Growth accounting typically starts by supposing a Cobb–Douglas produc-
tion function and then makes the distinction between moves along and shifts of
this production function in accounting for changes in labour productivity. So
Y ¼ AKaL1a ½1
where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour and A is TFP, while a and (12a) are
the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labour, respectively. Under
conventional (neoclassical) assumptions, a and (12a) are factor-share weights in
income, profits and wages, respectively. The basic growth-accounting formula is:
D lnðY=LÞ ¼ aD lnðK=LÞ þ D lnA ½2
This formula was first made famous by Solow (1957) and DlnA is, of course,
also known as Solow’s Residual. While it was clear to Solow that the residual
would capture any kind of shift in the production function, the concluding
summary of his paper said that 7/8ths of the growth in American labour pro-
ductivity between 1909 and 1949 was attributable to technical change (Solow
1957, p. 320).
This approach is quite flexible and can be adapted to embrace different
specifications of the production function either in terms of changing the
functional form (e.g. translog) or incorporating additional factors of pro-
duction (e.g. human capital) or distinguishing between different types of
physical capital (e.g. ICT capital vs. non-ICT capital).
2.1. How Important is Crude TFP in Accounting for
Labour Productivity Growth?
Crude TFP growth is the original Solow’s Residual, namely, the estimate that
is obtained from the basic growth-accounting formula set out above which does
not allow for any contribution to labour productivity growth other than that of
physical capital. The first issue to consider is whether Solow’s 7/8ths result
generalizes to the wide experience of modern economic growth in what are now
high-income countries, as Kuznets (1971), writing before historical growth
accounting had produced any results, thought that it probably would.
Solow’s finding that 7/8ths of US labour productivity growth during 1909-
1949 was accounted for by TFP growth (where no separate allowance is
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made for educational quality of the labour force) is still pretty much what
would be obtained applying his method to today’s data. This does not,
however, mean that this result has also been found by economic historians
consistently for other periods and different countries.
Table 1 reports that on the basis of conventional growth accounting for
the United States over the long run, the picture is one of dominance of crude
TFP from the late 19th century till the end of the post-World War II boom in
the late 1960s. However, Table 1 also shows that before 1890 and after 1966
crude TFP contributes at best only 50 per cent of labour productivity growth.
In fact, at face value, given that TFP growth is below 0.5 per cent per year
before 1890, the estimates in Table 1 invite the conclusion that technical change
was insignificant in the American economy for much of the 19th century and
only came to prominence with the rise of the science-based industries and R &
D in the so-called second Industrial Revolution. However, this runs counter to
standard historical discussions and is certainly not the interpretation in Abra-
movitz and David (2001). If, as they suggest, the 19th century US economy was
characterized by a low elasticity of substitution between factors together with
capital-using technical change, then TFP growth may have been considerably
stronger than shown in Table 1, which assumes that s51. Whereas the crude
TFP growth estimates give a rate of 0.24 per cent per year for 1835-1890, if,
instead, estimates are obtained using the assumption of an aggregate produc-
tion function with the properties that Abramovitz and David believe that the
TABLE 1
SOURCES OF US LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH OVER THE LONG RUN
(PER CENT PER YEAR)
Labour productivity Capital deepening Crude TFP
1800-1855 0.4 0.2 0.2
1855-1890 1.1 0.7 0.4
1890-1905 1.9 0.5 1.4
1905-1927 2.0 0.5 1.5
1929-1948 2.0 0.1 1.9
1948-1966 3.1 0.8 2.3
1966-1989 1.2 0.6 0.6
1990-2003 1.8 0.9 0.9
Notes: TFP: total factor productivity.
These estimates are obtained by the various authors on the basis of equations using the specification of
equation [2].
Sources: Abramovitz and David (2001) except for final period from Bosworth and Collins (2003),
updated by authors.
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evidence supports, this would generate a revised estimate for TFP growth of 0.9
per cent per year and thus restore it to a dominant role1.
For the late-20th century slowdown, it is also likely that the impression
given by Table 1 is misleading. Here, the main issue relates to the mea-
surement of output growth. Boskin et al. (1996) thought that, for a variety of
reasons, inflation had been overestimated (and thus real GDP and TFP
growth had been underestimated by a similar amount) in the national
accounts and that the correction required was of the order of 0.6 per cent per
year. Again, this would raise the contribution of crude TFP growth well
above that of capital deepening without quite reaching the 7/8ths mark2.
For other countries, the story is different. In Tables 2 and 3, the picture of
modern economic growth in Europe through the 1970s is set out. The estimates
reported in the former table show only two cases (Great Britain in 1801-1831
and Portugal in 1910-1934) where the TFP contribution to labour productivity
growth is as much as 80 per cent. A distinctive aspect of Table 2 is that as
modern economic growth spread across 19th century Europe TFP growth was
initially quite modest and any tendency for TFP growth to dominate capital
deepening is generally a post-1890 or post-take-off phenomenon. Looking at the
top of Table 3, crude TFP growth does dominate capital deepening but even so
the proportion accounted for is almost always less than 7/8ths.
As Krugman (1994) highlighted, and, as economic historians in the
Gerschenkronian tradition might have predicted, rapid catch-up growth in
the East Asian developmental states looks rather different from the earlier
OECD experience3. In Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, the contribution of
capital deepening has been formidable and exceeded that of TFP growth in
the period 1960-19904. There is a strong contrast with the well-known cases
of Italy, Japan and Spain in the Golden Age5.
In sum, it appears that the US growth record that Solow (1957) analysed was
far from typical of the experience of other industrialized economies in the two
centuries since the Industrial Revolution. Generally speaking, even without the
1 This calculation is based on the formula given by Rodrik (1997) that the correction to TFP
growth50.5a((12s)/s)(12a)(DK/K2DL/L)(DAL/AL2DAK/AK), where the term in the last par-
enthesis captures the degree of factor-saving bias in technological progress measured as the dif-
ference between the rate of labour augmentation and the rate of capital augmentation. The formula
is parameterized using values suggested in Abramovitz and David (2001), including s5 0.3, and
applying them to 1835-1890, the period which is singled out by these authors.
2 The Boskin bias in inflation measurement does not appear to generalize to other periods,
cf. Costa (2001).
3 In a very influential contribution, Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) proposed that the growth of
«backward» follower countries would differ from that their predecessors. In particular, there would
be a much greater emphasis on capital accumulation and a key role for what would later be called
the «developmental state» in implementing this.
4 Rodrik (1997) argued that the east Asian growth-accounting estimates were biased; applying a
similar correction formula to that in footnote 3 might add around 0.8 per cent per year to TFP
growth which would change the detail but not the substance of this point.
5 Portugal, however, is more similar to the East Asians.
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TABLE 2
SOURCES OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN INDUSTRIALIZING
ECONOMIES (PER CENT PER YEAR)
Labour productivity
growth
Capital-deepening
contribution
TFP
growth
Austria
1870-1890 0.90 0.64 0.26
1890-1910 1.69 0.66 1.03
Germany
1871-1891 1.10 0.39 0.71
1891-1911 1.76 0.58 1.18
Great Britain
1700-1760 0.40 0.14 0.26
1760-1801 0.20 0.07 0.13
1801-1831 0.50 0.10 0.40
1831-1873 1.25 0.35 0.90
1873-1913 0.90 0.38 0.52
Hungary
1870-1910 1.65 1.18 0.47
Italy
1920-1938 0.88 0.38 0.50
1951-1973 4.51 1.61 2.90
The Netherlands
1850-1870 1.02 0.50 0.52
1870-1890 0.94 0.61 0.33
1890-1913 1.35 0.46 0.89
Portugal
1910-1934 1.17 0.09 1.08
1934-1947 0.78 0.90 20.12
1947-1973 4.47 2.46 2.01
Spain
1850-1883 1.2 1.0 0.2
1884-1920 1.0 0.7 0.3
1920-1929 2.0 0.6 1.4
1930-1952 0.0 0.3 20.3
1951-1974 5.5 1.8 3.7
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refinements suggested by subsequent authors, which tend to downsize the role
of TFP, the contribution of TFP growth to labour productivity growth is well
below 7/8ths. Had Solow’s first growth-accounting estimate been made in the
1950s for Spain, the results would have been far less sensational.
2.2. TFP Growth does not equal the Rate of Technical Change
While Solow (1957) put the growth economics into growth accounting
and showed that the residual could be interpreted as a measure of the rate
of technical change, in practice, this is generally not the case. Indeed, the
estimated rate of TFP growth can be either an under- or an overestimate of
the contribution of technological change to labour productivity growth.
There are two important cases where it will be an underestimate. First, as
noted in the previous section, if technological change is labour saving and
the elasticity of substitution is less than one, then the rate of TFP growth
obtained by imposing standard assumptions of a Cobb–Douglas production
function with neutral technological change is too low. Second, if technological
change is embodied in new types of capital goods, as economic historians
TABLE 2 (Cont.)
Labour productivity
growth
Capital-deepening
contribution
TFP
growth
Sweden
1850-1890 1.18 1.12 0.06
1890-1913 2.77 0.94 1.83
1913-1950 2.01 0.87 1.14
1950-1973 3.68 1.82 1.86
Korea
1960-1990 5.06 2.84 2.22
Singapore
1960-1990 4.97 3.34 1.63
Taiwan
1960-1990 6.07 3.17 2.90
Notes: TFP: total factor productivity.
All estimates based on standard neoclassical formula and are re-calibrated with a5 0.35; Great Britain
is UK after 1831.
Sources: Derived from data presented in the following original growth-accounting studies: Austria and
Hungary: Schulze (2007); Germany: Broadberry (1998); Great Britain: Crafts (1995) and Matthews et al.
(1982); Italy: Rossi et al. (1992); The Netherlands: Albers and Groote (1996); Portugal: Lains (2003); Spain:
Prados de la Escosura and Roses (2009); Sweden: Krantz and Schon (2007) and Schon (2004); Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan: Bosworth and Collins (2003).
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often suggest and is common in endogenous-growth economics, then the
technological change contribution would subsume both TFP and part of
what is normally counted as capital-deepening (Barro 1999).
TABLE 3
ACCOUNTING FOR GROWTH IN MADDISON’S SIX-COUNTRY STUDY
(PER CENT PER YEAR)
France Germany Japan
The
Netherlands UK USA
1913-1950
Y/HW growth 2.01 1.05 1.72 1.58 1.57 2.42
K/HW 0.59 0.19 0.62 0.43 0.42 0.43
TFP 1.42 0.86 1.10 1.15 1.15 1.99
Capital quality 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Labour quality 0.36 0.22 0.61 0.27 0.32 0.35
Capacity use 0.00 20.13 20.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labour hoarding 0.00 20.20 20.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
Catch-up 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Structural 0.09 0.20 0.62 0.00 20.04 0.29
Foreign trade 0.01 20.04 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01
Scale 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Unexplained 0.48 0.32 0.13 0.41 0.38 0.81
1950-1973
Y/HW growth 5.12 5.96 7.82 4.44 3.18 2.50
K/HW 1.10 1.64 2.02 1.09 1.04 0.65
TFP 4.02 4.32 5.80 3.35 2.14 1.85
Capital quality 0.56 0.53 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.51
Labour quality 0.35 0.18 0.52 0.40 0.09 0.29
Capacity use 0.00 0.25 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00
Labour hoarding 0.00 0.32 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
Catch-up 0.52 0.68 1.02 0.38 0.14 0.00
Structural 0.46 0.36 1.22 20.07 0.10 0.12
Foreign trade 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.65 0.16 0.05
Scale 0.15 0.18 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.11
Other 20.02 20.02 20.02 0.22 20.02 20.04
Unexplained 1.81 1.63 0.64 1.06 1.06 0.81
Note: HW: hours worked, TFP: total factor productivity, Y: GDP.
Source: Derived from Maddison (1987).
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On the other hand, especially when TFP growth is rapid, as in famous
cases of catch-up growth, it is likely that there is a substantial component
from reductions in inefficiency, both allocative and productive. For example,
Maddison (1987), like Denison (1967), concluded that much of the Solow
residual was typically attributable to some combination of labour quality,
improved allocation of resources, changes in the utilization of factors of
production, reductions in technology gaps and economies of scale leaving
only a modest share «unexplained» — and perhaps reflecting disembodied
technical change (cf. Table 3).
Maddison’s list of the components of rapid TFP growth in the European
Golden Age is broadly in line with conventional economic histories but
precise quantification is, of course, very difficult and there is no consensus on
the details6. Maddison himself acknowledged that his exercise was rather
speculative and papers in the empirical-growth literature cast doubt on its
reliability without, however, amounting to an alternative decomposition. For
example, Broadberry (1998) proposes a different calculation for the effect
of structural change, which would increase its magnitude considerably;
Badinger (2005) offers an econometric estimation of the productivity
implications of economic integration, which suggests that foreign trade was
more important than Maddison suggests. Nevertheless, these are issues
about the detail, not the principle.
It should be noted that the various components of TFP growth differ in
relative importance over time while it is generally believed that the factor-
saving bias of technological change has also varied, as indeed new growth
economics suggests should be the case (Acemoglu 1998). This means that
differences in the rate of TFP growth between periods may not be a good
guide to comparative rates of technological change. This point is accentuated
when it is recognized that growth-accounting estimates sometimes indicate
negative TFP growth over lengthy periods, for example, as in much of Africa
over the last decades of the 20th century (Bosworth and Collins 2003). This
seems much more plausibly interpreted as reflecting problems of inefficiency
and capacity utilization rather then technological decline.
When growth accounting is used to compare levels of labour productivity
across countries, it is now generally agreed that TFP gaps account a large
part of the difference between rich and poor countries. Table 4 reports
results from a recent study by Duval and de la Maisonneuve (2009), which
show this and which confirm the basic findings in the much-cited paper
by Hall and Jones (1999), which also notes that the TFP gaps seem to be
strongly correlated with low levels of institutional quality.
6 It should be noted that the results of a data envelopment analysis also give strong support to
the claim that TFP growth during the European Golden Age was boosted considerably by
improvements over time in the efficiency of factor use (Jerzmanowski 2007).
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What explains low TFP levels in poor countries? This could represent
inefficient use of factor inputs. But, it could also result from «inappropriate
technology» in the sense that the technological advances in rich coun-
tries improve the production function at their factor endowments but not
at those prevailing in poor countries contrary to the conventional neo-
classical assumption that the production function improves proportio-
nately at all factor intensities. So, the conventional decomposition of labour
productivity differences into a component from TFP and a component
from the capital to labour ratio, as in Figure 1A, is modified to allow for
discontinuities in the production function as in Figure 1B. This allows
TFP to be decomposed into a technology component and an inefficiency
component.
Jerzmanowski (2007) implemented an analysis of this kind and some of
his results are summarized in Table 5. These give some support to both
hypotheses, though very low levels of TFP do seem to be primarily due to
TABLE 4
DECOMPOSITION OF CROSS-COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN GDP PER PERSON,
2005. (USA5100)
Y/P TFP HK/L K/Y L/P
USA 100 100 100 100 100
Canada 83.5 72.0 103.3 105.8 106.0
Australia1NZ 78.3 64.1 101.5 114.8 104.5
Japan 72.6 52.6 100.4 130.7 105.1
EU271EFTA 64.7 67.8 91.2 114.1 91.3
Russia 28.6 31.5 84.9 97.4 99.3
Brazil 20.5 29.3 70.1 103.1 96.8
China 9.8 13.6 57.3 105.2 119.5
India 5.2 12.7 47.7 98.3 87.1
Rest of the world 12.3 20.9 59.7 103.6 81.7
World 22.8 27.9 64.2 104.2 95.8
Notes: TFP: total factor productivity, HK: human capital, P: population, NZ: New Zealand, EU27: the
group of 27 countries that currently comprise the European Union, EFTA: European Free Trade Area,
Y/P is measured at PPP.
Estimates derived by imposing the production function Y5Ka(AhL)12a where h is human capital per
worker; Y is output, K is capital and L is labour.
This can be re-written as Y/L5 (K/Y)a/(12a)Ah so that Y/P5 (K/Y)a/(12a)Ah(L/P), which is the formula
used for the decomposition.
Source: Duval and de la Maisonneuve (2009).
NICHOLAS CRAFTS
418 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
low efficiency, and suggest that negative TFP growth in Africa should be
interpreted as due to reductions in efficiency rather than technological
decline7. Catch-up growth in East Asia and in Europe has resulted both
from bridging the technology gap and from improvements in efficiency,
albeit in quite different proportions in various countries. More generally
though, the point that emerges is that TFP growth in excess of 1.5 per cent
per year is generally to be interpreted as resulting from considerable
improvements in efficiency as well as technology. Transferring labour out
of agriculture is typically part of this but so is improving the management
of firms8.
FIGURE 1A
DECOMPOSITION OF OUTPUT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COUNTRIES
1 AND 2 UNDER APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
y
y2
y′1
y1
due to k
due to TFP
1
y = A2kα
k
2
Source: Jerzmanowski (2007).
7 Caselli and Coleman (2006) conduct a similar analysis, but use a different specification for the
production function and a different econometric methodology. Nevertheless, their results lead to
similar conclusions.
8 Inefficient use of inputs is still characteristic of both Chinese and Indian manufacturing;
if capital and labour were used as efficiently as in the United States, Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
estimate that manufacturing TFP would rise by 25-40 per cent in India and 50-60 per cent in
China.
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2.3. What Have General Purpose Technologies (GPTs)
Meant for Productivity Growth?
The Solow Productivity Paradox was announced in 1987 with the comment
that «You can see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity
statistics». Subsequently, a great deal of effort was devoted to explaining this
(Triplett 1999), and it was an important trigger for the literature on GPTs
which developed models that had negligible or even negative impacts on
productivity performance in their first phase, but substantial positive effects
later. Indeed, a GPT can be defined as «a technology that initially has much
scope for improvement and eventually comes to be widely used, to have many
uses and to have many Hicksian and technological complementarities» (Lipsey
et al. 1998, p. 43).
Table 6 compares the impact of two GPTs, namely, steam and ICT, in the
leading economies of the time. These were indeed technologies in which the
potential was not well understood in the early days. Thus, the pioneers of steam
power did not realize its implications for transport over both land and sea and
the early developers of microchips did not foresee the mobile phone and the
Internet. While the improvement in microchip technology was forecast early on
(Moore’s Law), the advantages of high pressure over low pressure steam only
FIGURE 1B
DECOMPOSITION OF OUTPUT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COUNTRIES 1 AND 2
UNDER INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
y
y2
y′1
y1
due to k
due to E
1
y = A2kα
k
2
y′′1
due to T
y = A(k)kα 
Source: Jerzmanowski (2007).
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TABLE 5
TECHNOLOGY AND EFFICIENCY AS SOURCES OF TFP GROWTH, 1960-1995
(PER CENT PER YEAR)
A. Rates of Growth
TFP Efficiency Technology
Ireland 1.95 0.92 1.03
Italy 1.54 0.60 0.94
Spain 1.38 0.39 0.99
Hong Kong 3.06 2.08 0.98
Japan 1.83 0.96 0.87
Korea 2.05 0.81 1.24
Singapore 2.57 1.75 0.82
India 0.75 0.20 0.55
Congo 22.93 22.52 20.41
Tanzania 20.17 20.79 0.62
Zambia 21.51 21.52 0.01
B. Levels
1960 1995
TFP Efficiency Technology TFP Efficiency Technology
Ireland 0.51 0.55 0.93 0.74 0.76 0.98
Italy 0.67 0.71 0.94 0.84 0.88 0.96
Spain 0.64 0.74 0.86 0.76 0.85 0.90
Hong Kong 0.41 0.47 0.88 0.89 0.98 0.91
Japan 0.48 0.56 0.86 0.68 0.79 0.86
Korea 0.33 0.37 0.88 0.49 0.49 0.99
Singapore 0.47 0.54 0.87 0.85 1.00 0.85
India 0.30 0.41 0.74 0.29 0.44 0.67
Congo 0.38 0.58 0.65 0.10 0.24 0.41
Tanzania 0.15 0.22 0.69 0.11 0.17 0.64
Zambia 0.30 0.34 0.88 0.13 0.20 0.67
Notes: TFP: total factor productivity. The decomposition is based on assuming a production function
yi5Aiki
ahi
12a, Ai5TiEi and T(ki, hi) as in Figure 1B. a is assumed to be 0.33 and efficiency, Ei, is
calculated from a data envelopment analysis. Then, technology, Ti, is backed out from5Ai/Ei where all
variables are measured relative to the United States5 1.
Source: Derived from Jerzmanowski (2007); additional observations kindly provided by author.
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became clear many years after James Watt’s (1769) patent. Technological pro-
gress led to a dramatic fall of about 50 per cent per year in the cost of computing
between 1950 and 2005 (Nordhaus 2007). By contrast, the cost of steam power
fell by only about 7/8ths in total between 1760 and 1910 (Crafts 2004).
Two points stand out from Table 6. First, it was a very long time after
James Watt’s invention that steam had any significant effect on labour pro-
ductivity growth. The long lag reflected the time it took to improve the
technology so that it consumed less coal and became cost-effective — only
about 165,000 horsepower were in use as late as 1830 (Kanefsky 1979).
Second, the impact of ICT on the rate of productivity growth throughout 1973-
2006 exceeded that of steam in any period and was already close to twice the
maximum impact of steam in the late 1980s. Indeed, these estimates suggest
that the cumulative impact of ICT on labour productivity by 2006 was about the
same as that of steam over the whole 150-year period, 1760-1910.
The arithmetic of growth accounting immediately reveals why the initial
impact of a GPT is relatively modest. Despite rapid growth in the use
and productivity of the new technology, it has only a small weight in the
economy as a whole. To an economic historian, the true paradox is that
Solow’s ICT paradox was regarded as such, given that by earlier standards
TABLE 6
STEAM AND ICT CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
(PER CENT PER YEAR)
A. Steam in UK
1760-1800 1800-1830 1830-1850 1850-1870 1870-1910
Capital deepening 0.004 0.02 0.16 0.20 0.15
TFP growth 0.005 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.16
Total 0.01 0.02 0.20 0.41 0.31
B. ICT in USA
1973-95 1995-2000 2000-2006
Capital deepening 0.46 1.09 0.61
TFP growth 0.28 0.75 0.51
Total 0.74 1.84 1.12
Notes: TFP: total factor productivity. «steam» includes stationary steam engines, railways and steam ships;
«ICT» includes semi-conductors, computer hardware and software and telecommunications equipment.
Estimates based on a growth-accounting formula that distinguishes between information communication
technology (ICT) or steam capital deepening and other capital deepening with appropriate factor-share weights
and, using Domar weights, between TFP growth in ICT or steam power production and other TFP growth.
Sources: Crafts (2004); Oliner et al. (2007)
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the contribution of ICT in the late 1980s was already stunning. A plausible
inference seems to be that society is getting better at exploiting the oppor-
tunities presented by new GPTs; that may reflect a number of factors
including more investment in human capital, superior scientific knowledge,
improved capital markets and greater support for R & D by public policy.
2.4. User Benefits of New Technologies
One of the most famous episodes in cliometrics concerned the con-
tribution of the railroads to 19th-century American economic growth.
The best-known study was by Fogel (1964) who pioneered the technique
of social savings (SS) as a methodology. This is based on estimating the cost-
savings of the new technology compared with the next best alternative. A
contribution from railroad capital deepening is not included as it is assumed
that this earned a normal profit equal to its opportunity cost so, in the
absence of railroads, another investment would deliver an equal return9.
The saving in resource costs was also taken to be equal to the gain in real
national income (Fogel 1979, p. 3). This is valid if the rest of the economy
is perfectly competitive with constant returns to scale (Jara-Diaz 1986).
Imperfect competition or benefits from internal or external economies of
scale in the transport-using sector will mean that the economic benefits
exceed the transport benefits. The new economic geography suggests that
we should take these seriously and this is an important agenda for future
research; in growth-accounting terms this would amount to looking for TFP
spillovers.
For railways the amount of SS was calculated as
SS ¼ ðPT0PT1ÞT1 ½3
where PT0 is the price of the alternative transport mode, water, PT1 is the
price of rail transport and T1 is the quantity transported by rail. Fogel
deliberately intended this to be an upper-bound measure, constructed as if
demand for transport was perfectly price inelastic, to compensate for omitted
gains in the transport-using sector.
The natural interpretation of the gain in real income obtained from
reducing resource costs in transportation is as an increase in TFP. Harberger
(1998) reminded us that TFP growth can be interpreted as real cost reduction
and the price dual measure of TFP confirms that the rate of fall over time in
the real cost of railroad transport under competitive conditions is also equal
to TFP growth. Since railroads will only be introduced at the point where
they can offer transport at the same cost as water transportation, if expressed
9 If railroads earned supernormal profits, then it would be appropriate to add just the producer
surplus component of profits to find a true estimate of the real income gain (McClelland 1972).
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as a contribution to the annual growth rate, the SS measure should equate to
the own TFP growth contribution. Indeed, this equivalence is exactly how
Foreman-Peck (1991) extended the social saving estimate for British railways
made by Hawke (1970) for 1865-1890.
The price dual measure of TFP growth equivalent to equation [2] is
DA=A ¼ sKDr=r þ sLDw=wDp=p ½4
where r is the profit rate, w is the wage rate and p is output price. Thus,
when input prices are constant, TFP growth equals the rate of nominal price
decline.
Using this result, the rail SS in year t compared with the year of intro-
duction, t21, expressed as a fraction of rail revenue is
ðpt1  ptÞqt=ptqt ¼ pt 1=pt  1 ¼ A=At1  1 ½5
or expressed as a fraction of GDP is
ðA=At 1  1Þ  ðptqt=GDPtÞ ½6
Rail SS as a proportion of GDP are revealed to be the percentage change in
TFP in the rail industry multiplied by the ratio of rail output to GDP. The
social saving approach is then equivalent to taking only the TFP and not the
embodied capital contribution of an innovation.
A major advantage of the social-saving methodology is that it focuses
attention on the distribution of the benefits from a new technology together
with how well these benefits are measured. In the case of railways, in both
Spain and the United Kingdom, the evidence is that users got the lion’s share
of the benefits in terms of cheaper and faster transport and that there were
few supernormal profits, as Table 7 reports. This would not be a surprise to
Nordhaus (2004) who estimated that 98 per cent of the social gains from new
technology went to the users and only 2 per cent to supernormal profits in the
United States in the second half of the 20th century.
TABLE 7
SOCIAL GAINS FROM RAILWAYS, 1912 (%GDP)
Spain UK
User benefits 4.3 12.5
Supernormal profits 0.3 20.5
Memorandum item
Net revenue 1.6 1.9
Sources: Herranz-Loncan (2006); Mitchell et al. (2009).
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This discussion has been conducted entirely in terms of a closed econ-
omy. However, in an open economy, the users and producers of new tech-
nologies may be in different countries. Since the products of the new
technology will experience falling prices, the impact of its production on real
GDP will be greater that on real national income. History tells us that this
consideration can be serious. The best example is probably cotton textiles
during the British Industrial Revolution. Harley (1999) concluded that
the welfare gain from the growth of cotton textiles during the Industrial
Revolution was a little above 11 per cent of 1841 income, whereas valuing
output of the sector without making a terms of trade correction would have
shown a gain of 25 per cent. The social saving methodology by valuing gains
from domestic use of new technology is a better guide to welfare benefits
than the usual growth-accounting estimate.
Finally, it should be recognized that technological change may provide
«new goods» that have previously unavailable characteristics and are
imperfect substitutes for the old. This type of benefit, which reflects con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for the new attribute, is ignored in conventional
growth accounting, although it may be large as Hausman (1997) showed
when comparing mobile with landline telephones. For railways, the new
characteristic was the speed of passenger travel. Indeed, time savings
account for about half the SS in the United Kingdom in 1912 reported
in Table 7. Implications for time use deserve to be taken seriously in
the context of other technologies, most obviously ICT, as is suggested
in an innovative paper by Goolsbee and Klenow (2006). They estimated
that taking into account the opportunity cost of time saved, the consumer
gains from the Internet in the United States in 2005 were $2500 per person
rather than the $50 that resulted from a conventional consumer-surplus
calculation.
3. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITIES OF
NEW TECHNOLOGY
Economic historians are fascinated by success and failure in long-run
growth. They have always been inclined to believe that institutions and
policies, that is, incentive structures, matter in this context even when main-
stream economics claimed that they could only have levels rather than growth-
rate effects. With the advent of endogenous growth theory and explicit analysis
of the determinants of innovation, there is now much more common ground
between economics and economic history, although significant differences of
emphasis remain. Some of these stem from the explicitly internationally
comparative nature of much work in economic history, and some from the
perspective that results from looking at the process of adjusting to change as
technology evolves and diffuses.
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3.1. Appropriate Technology
As noted earlier, there has been considerable interest among economists
recently in the hypothesis that technologies developed for the factor
endowments and cost conditions of advanced countries may not improve the
production function for poor countries (cf. Figure 1B). This idea looms larger
in work by economic historians on the development and adoption of new
technology, notably, with regard to the divergence between American and
British technology during the 19th and early 20th centuries and also to the
reasons why the Industrial Revolution happened first in Britain.
Habakkuk (1962) famously claimed that land abundance and labour scar-
city in the United States promoted rapid, labour-saving technological change.
New economic historians spent quite a long time trying to pin down these
arguments. Eventually, it was found that the United States was able to exploit
complementarities between capital and natural resources to economize on the
use of skilled labour in an important subset of American manufacturing (James
and Skinner 1985) and that scale economies and technological change biased
in favour of capital and materials-using were pervasive in manufacturing (Cain
and Paterson 1986).
Following the lead of David (1975), Broadberry (1994) used Figures 2A
and 2B to locate this as a situation of localized technological progress in the
FIGURE 2A
CHOICE OF TECHNOLOGY: THE ROLE OF FACTOR PRICES
Po
A
B
L/Y
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APF
P1
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FPFK
/Y
Source: David (1975).
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two economies, down the a and b rays rather than a universal inwards
shift of a smooth isoquant. Although eventually the a technology might
develop far enough to dominate at both sets of relative factor prices, it might
remain inappropriate for the country starting from point B for a long
time. Acemoglu (2009) provides a model in the endogenous-innovation
tradition that predicts an outcome like Figure 2B of faster technological
change under conditions of labour scarcity if, as may well be the case for the
19th century, technology is biased in the direction of being strongly labour
saving.
Looking at late-Victorian Britain, the flip side of this story is that inno-
vations that were made in the United States were frequently inappropriate on
the other side of the Atlantic because they were not cost-effective at British
relative factor prices and/or market size; had they been profit-maximizing,
competition in product markets would have ensured rapid adoption (Magee
2004). Thus, allegations that «entrepreneurial failure» was to blame for the
neglect of American technology made by writers such as Landes (1969) were
misplaced and British business was exonerated. The implication is that lower
TFP in British industry was unavoidable. Unlike the inappropriate-technology
FIGURE 2B
TECHNICAL PROGRESS: LOCALISED CHANGE
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Source: David (1975).
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literature in economics, however, this is about the development of North–
North rather than North–South technology.
Allen (2009) takes a global perspective on the first Industrial Revolu-
tion and argues that it happened in Britain because of the unique relative
factor–price configuration there, in particular, the combination of very
expensive labour and very cheap energy. He points to the success of famous
innovations, for example, in textiles and metals, in changing factor propor-
tions by using coal and saving labour — maybe this is best seen as induced
factor substitution making available a new point on the available process
frontier (APF) in Figure 2A.
Allen stresses that the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution were
very expensive to develop and, since they were not profitable to adopt in
other countries, the only place where it was rational to do the R & D was
Britain10. Eventually, as the Industrial Revolution technologies advanced,
they became profitable to adopt in other countries with different factor prices
and Britain’s advantage proved transient. Again, an endogenous innovation
approach can help make this argument work in theory as well as in practice.
The model of directed technical change in Acemoglu (1998), in which profits
to innovation are proportional to market size because of fixed costs of
developing new technology, would be a possibility.
3.2. Social Capability and Schumpeterian Growth
For almost all countries including those which do substantial amounts of
R & D such as France, Germany and United Kingdom, the main source
of technological advance is technology transfer from abroad (Eaton and
Kornum 1999). This places a premium on the ability effectively to assimilate
imported technology both in terms of speed of its diffusion and realization of
its productivity potential. In a very influential paper, Abramovitz (1986)
phasized that catch-up by follower countries was by no means automatic but
depended on «social capability», that is, having incentive structures based
on institutions and policies that were conducive to the necessary investment
and innovation.
The claim that institutions matter is, of course, characteristic of eco-
nomic historians’ work on economic growth and development, most
famously identified with North (1990). Here, since the mid-1990s, there has
been a convergence between work on catch-up growth by economists and
economic historians. Following the pioneering paper by Knack and Keefer
(1995), it quickly became routine to include a measure of the quality of
formal institutions in growth regressions and to find that it is economically
10 For example, Allen (2009) estimates that the rate of return on investing in a spinning jenny in
the 1770s was 38 per cent in Britain, 2.5 per cent in France and 25.2 per cent in India.
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and statistically important (Bleaney and Nishiyama 2002). Similarly, since
Hall and Jones (1999), it has become widely accepted that low TFP levels in
poor countries is to a considerable extent due to inefficiency that persists in
the context of bad institutions.
Clearly, there are important differences as well as similarities between
these two literatures. In particular, there are features of the economic history
work that have not yet been fully reflected in that of the economists. First, it
is important to note the influential argument of Gerschenkron (1962) that at
an early stage of development the institutions (and policies), which are
appropriate, might differ from those desirable at more advanced stages
of development. This entailed a more proactive role for the state, wider
boundaries for the firm and greater reliance on relationship banking given
the importance of co-ordination problems, inadequacy of the formal legal
system and a premium on dealing with capital market failures. It is also
relevant to note that reform to achieve a more orthodox stance once take-off
has been achieved will probably be desirable but possibly difficult as proved
to be the case in East Asia (Crafts 1999).
Second, the new institutional economic history stresses both the persis-
tence of institutions and also the absence of any general tendency for good
institutions to replace bad ones; a lot of weight is put on path dependence in
institutional change (North 2005). Once in place, institutional arrangements
can develop network externalities and the support of the interest groups that
they spawn. Informal as well as formal institutions matter but they are not
readily amenable to «top-down» reform. Thus, «bad» or outmoded institu-
tions, which arose through choices made long ago in different circumstances,
may survive.
This suggests that many economists are over-optimistic about the pro-
spects for catch-up and convergence in poor countries. If institutions matter
and need continual reform to achieve full catch-up, it is very possible that
countries either get stuck in a low-level equilibrium (much of Sub-Saharan
Africa) or find catch-up easy to start but difficult to complete (e.g. Japan).
Thus, the neoclassical prediction of future convergence of incomes appears
to be very optimistic even though enthusiasts argue that, now that it is
understood which institutions and policies are conducive to growth, in a
globalized world rapid catch-up growth financed by capital inflows should be
much easier to achieve (Lucas 2000). Similarly, the projections of future
catch-up by the so-called Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) economies
that have been popularized by Goldman Sachs (Wilson and Purushothaman
2003) have a mechanistic flavour which abstracts from the political economy
of development.
It is useful to link the discussion of social capability to modern growth
theory. The obvious way to do this is to consider the endogenous-innovation
model proposed by Aghion and Howitt (2006) in which technological pro-
gress occurs through quality-improving innovations that render old products
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obsolete and which they describe as «Schumpeterian» because it entails
creative destruction. This model can be simply captured by the following
equations:
y ¼ A1 aka ½7
where y is output per worker and A is labour-augmenting technological
progress.
DA ¼ mnðg  1ÞA þ mmðAn  AÞ ½8
where mn and mm are the frequencies with which, respectively, «leading-
edge» and «catch-up» innovations occur, (A*2A) is the technology gap with
the leader and g is the multiple by which technology improves with a leading-
edge innovation. Growth is increased by institutions and policies that
increase mn and/or mm. Countries which are close to (far from) the frontier
need to concentrate on developing a configuration that is good for mn (mm).
It should be noted that institutions and policies which are conducive to
leading-edge innovations may be less effective or even adverse for catch-up
innovations. Strong product-market competition policy may be a case in
point, according to Aghion and Howitt (2006). For close-to-frontier situations
encouraging entry threats stimulates innovation which will allow the domestic
firm to survive whereas in far-from-frontier cases entry will lead to exit of the
domestic firm whether it has innovated or not. As I explore below, a permu-
tation on this idea with salience for economic history is that the institutions
and policies that are good for one technological era (say, Fordism) are less
appropriate for another era (say, ICT). The parallel with the Gerschenkronian
perspective is readily apparent. It will be desirable to reform and for institu-
tions and policies to evolve as countries progress through a process of catch-up.
This may not be easy.
3.3. The Golden Age of European Economic Growth, 1950-1973
The Golden Age of European economic growth was an episode of strong
b-convergence, as Table 8 suggests. Abramovitz and David (1996) explained
this in terms of increased «social capability» and «technological congruence»
compared with the period after World War I11. With regard to the former, an
important aspect was the corporatist capitalism, highlighted by Eichengreen
(1996), that underwrote an investment boom. With regard to the latter, the
point is that by now American technology was more appropriate for Europe
as factor–price differences narrowed and European markets became more
11 The decomposition of the TFP gap provided by Jerzmanowski (2007) suggests that this claim
about technological congruence is plausible (cf. Table 5).
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integrated (Nelson and Wright 1992)12. The strengthening of competition
together with trade liberalization also underpinned rapid TFP growth based
on reductions in inefficiency (cf. Table 3).
The most striking hypothesis to explain enhanced social capability in
postwar Europe is that of Eichengreen (1996) who argued that the high
investment rates which allowed successful exploitation of catch-up oppor-
tunities were facilitated by social contracts which sustained wage modera-
tion by workers in return for high investment by firms. These «corporatist»
arrangements provided institutions to monitor capitalists’ compliance and
TABLE 8
LEVELS AND RATES OF GROWTH OF REAL GDP PER PERSON IN WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ($1990GK AND PER CENT PER YEAR)
1950 1973 1950-1973
Switzerland 9,064 18,204 3.08
Denmark 6,943 13,945 3.08
UK 6,939 12,025 2.42
Sweden 6,739 12,494 3.06
The Netherlands 5,971 13,081 3.45
Belgium 5,462 12,170 3.54
Norway 5,430 11,324 3.24
France 5,271 13,114 4.04
West Germany 4,281 13,153 5.02
Finland 4,253 11,085 4.25
Austria 3,706 11,235 4.94
Italy 3,502 10,634 4.95
Ireland 3,453 6,867 3.03
Spain 2,189 7,661 5.60
Portugal 2,086 7,063 5.45
Greece 1,915 7,655 6.21
Source: Maddison (2003).
12 A formal model of conditional convergence which incorporates appropriate technology
shows that a «growth miracle» phase can happen as accumulation of capital drives factor endow-
ments into the range where the production function has improved and technology transfer suddenly
becomes profitable (Basu and Weil 1998).
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co-ordinated wage bargaining that protected high-investment firms and
prevented free-riding by subsets of workers13. In addition, the state provided
«bonds» that would be jeopardized if labour defected on the agreements in
the form of an expanded welfare state. Not all countries succeeded in
achieving the co-operative equilibrium; West Germany did but the United
Kingdom did not. Co-ordinated wage bargaining can be shown to have
promoted investment and growth up to 1975 but not thereafter (Gilmore 2009).
The central foundation of a high-investment/wage moderation equilibrium is
that both sides are willing to wait for jam tomorrow. By the 1970s, there were
good reasons for patience to be much lower, including the greater mobility of
capital and the productivity slowdown (Cameron and Wallace 2002).
Although all countries grew rapidly by their own historical standards,
some seized the opportunities of the Golden Age better than others. Table 8
suggests that West Germany outperformed and the United Kingdom under-
performed relative to the predictions of an unconditional convergence
regression; Table 3 points to weaker TFP growth in the United Kingdom as a
key aspect. This reflects differences in social capability.
First, it is clear that West Germany was much more successful in human
and physical capital accumulation. In 1973, capital per hour worked in
West Germany was 35 per cent above the United Kingdom level and in 1978/
9 only 34.5 per cent of West German workers were low skill compared with
72.8 per cent in the United Kingdom (O’Mahony 1999). This strong record
of accumulation was based on corporatist institutions and an «insider»
financial system that fostered relationship-specific long-term investments
(Carlin 1996). Second, there was a major difference between the two coun-
tries in terms of industrial relations; whereas West Germany established a
system of industrial unions, multiple unionism was quite prevalent in the
United Kingdom. Multiple unionism makes the «hold-up problem» for
investments in fixed capital much more serious and encourages free-riding
by unions; Bean and Crafts (1996) show that this exerted a significant penalty
in terms of productivity growth for the United Kingdom. Third, there was
weaker competition in the United Kingdom partly because of slower liber-
alization of external trade and partly because competition policy was a low
priority and badly designed. Price–cost margins were much higher and
supernormal profits more persistent in the United Kingdom than in West
Germany (Crafts and Mills 2005; Geroski and Jacquemin 1988). This mattered
because United Kingdom firms suffered more from the agency problems that
arise where shareholders are weak and for which competition is the antidote14.
13 «Corporatist» industrial relations were quite common (Crouch 1993); in other cases, such as
France and Italy, government intervention achieved similar results (Toniolo 1998).
14 West Germany relied much less on public joint stock companies where these issues are likely
to matter most. German companies almost always had a shareholder with 25 per cent of the
company whereas in the United Kingdom only a small percentage did (Carlin 1996, p. 488).
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The United Kingdom evidence is that weak competition in the absence of
a dominant external shareholder was associated with markedly inferior pro-
ductivity performance (Nickell et al. 1997).
Two points should be taken from this discussion. First, incentive struc-
tures do matter for the effective assimilation of new technology and for
productivity growth and these have varied significantly across advanced
European countries in the recent past. Second, the United Kingdom had
problems in the areas of corporate governance with an extreme degree of
separation of ownership and control which allowed bad management to
continue and in industrial relations with a tradition of craft control of effort
bargains. Both these historical legacies were sustained by weak competition
and were serious handicaps to the effective assimilation of American tech-
nology in the United Kingdom but policymakers were unwilling to address
these issues.
TABLE 9
ICT AND POST-1995 EUROPEAN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Decomposition of labour productivity growth, 1995-2004 (per cent per year)*
Labour
productivity
growth
Labour
quality
ICT capital
deepening
TFP
growth
Knowledge
economy
France 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.7
Germany 1.6 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.9
Italy 0.5 0.1 0.3 20.4 20.1
Spain 0.2 0.4 0.3 20.9 20.2
UK 2.7 0.5 1.0 0.7 2.2
USA 3.0 0.3 0.8 1.4 2.5
Contribution of ICT-using services to aggregate labour productivity growth,
1996-2001 (per cent per year)**
France 20.1
Germany 0.1
Italy 0.1
Spain 0.1
UK 0.8
USA 1.3
*Notes: TFP: total factor productivity. Estimates are for market sector and knowledge economy is sum
of labour quality, information communication technology (ICT) capital deepening and TFP.
*Source: van Ark et al. (2008)
**Note: ICT-using services include financial services and distribution.
**Source: Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005).
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3.4. A Historical Perspective on the ICT Era
It is well-known that the United States has enjoyed a labour productivity
growth revival since the mid-1990s and that, for the first time in the postwar
period, this has outpaced average western European performance. About the
same time, it became very clear that the Solow Productivity Paradox no longer
applied as the ICT contribution to American productivity growth increased. A
standard American perspective on recent European growth is that it has been
handicapped by too much taxation, too much regulation and too little com-
petition (Baily and Kirkegaard 2004). It is clear that this is an accurate
description of the average of European countries compared with the United
States; it was, however, equally true for the 20 years or so before 1995 during
which productivity growth in Europe was well above that in America and the
European productivity catch-up continued (Crafts and Toniolo 2008).
TABLE 10
REGULATION INDICES (0-6)
Product market regulation*
1978 1988 1998a 1998b 2003 2008
France 6.0 5.8 4.3 2.52 1.75 1.45
Germany 5.2 5.1 2.8 2.06 1.60 1.33
Italy 5.8 5.8 4.7 2.59 1.81 1.38
Spain 5.0 4.9 3.5 2.55 1.68 1.09
UK 4.8 3.8 1.4 1.07 0.82 0.84
USA 3.7 2.4 1.6 1.28 1.01 0.84
Employment protection**
1960-1964 1973-1979 1988-1995 1998 2003
France 1.11 3.63 4.23 4.20 4.20
Germany 1.35 4.95 4.56 3.90 3.36
Italy 5.76 6.00 5.67 4.50 2.91
Spain 6.00 5.97 5.22 4.20 4.50
UK 0.48 0.99 1.05 1.05 1.05
USA 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
*Notes: The years 1978 through 2008 are each on a comparable basis; product market regulation is
conceptualized as regulation that inhibits competition. A higher score indicates more regulation.
*Sources: Conway and Nicoletti (2006); Wolfl et al. (2009).
**Notes: «Employment protection» is conceptualized as equivalent to a tax on labour force adjustment.
A higher score indicates more employment protection.
**Source: Nickell (2005).
NICHOLAS CRAFTS
434 Revista de Historia Econo´mica, Journal of lberian and Latin American Economic History
ICT has played a big part in the recent discrepancy between European
and American productivity performance, as is reflected in Table 9. Both ICT-
capital deepening and TFP growth were much stronger in the United States
than in the large continental European economies, as was the contribution
made by service sectors that use ICT intensively (such as retailing) to labour
productivity growth. Investment in ICT capital also has a strong lagged effect
on TFP growth in the same sector in the United States (Basu and Fernald
2007). This seems to reflect re-organization of production, workforce train-
ing and learning-by-using within firms (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003)15.
Recent research has found that the adverse effects of regulation on pro-
ductivity performance are strongest in the face of new technological opportu-
nities and have impacted strongly on the diffusion of ICT. Cross-country
regression evidence shows that employment protection deters investment in ICT
equipment (Gust and Marquez 2004) because re-organizing working practices
and upgrading the labour force, which are central to realizing ICT’s productivity
potential, are made more expensive. Restrictive product market regulation has
deterred investment in ICT capital directly (Conway et al. 2006) and the indirect
effect of regulation through raising costs has been relatively pronounced in
sectors that use ICT intensively. There has been a strong correlation between
product market regulation and the contribution of ICT-using services (notably in
distribution) to overall productivity growth (Nicoletti and Scarpetta 2005).
Stronger competition in close-to-frontier economies would have been beneficial
in the recent past, as Aghion and Howitt (2006) argued, but perhaps the
strongest reason for this would have been favourable effects on implementing
technology transfer rather than creating leading-edge innovations.
Table 10 shows that regulation has been more tight in Europe than in
the United States. At the same time, the picture is one of moves towards
de-regulation in Europe in the last 20 years or so. Thus, the story is not that
regulation has become more stringent but rather that existing regulation has
become more costly in the context of a new technological era based on ICT.
The United Kingdom has experienced a relatively strong contribution to
productivity growth from the regulation-sensitive ICT-using services sector
and ICT capital deepening has been above the EU average. As a lightly
regulated economy characterized by strong competition, since the Thatcher
reforms the United Kingdom has been better positioned than the other big
European economies to prosper in the ICT era. This has been reflected in
TFP growth and relatively strong contributions to productivity growth from
both ICT-using services and ICT capital deepening. In a sense, this can be
15 This implies that it may be necessary to re-think growth-accounting estimates to make
explicit the role of investment in intangible capital which has probably been much larger in the
«New Economy» era than before. This will probably account for part of what is captured by TFP in
conventional growth accounting, as is found by a pioneering study for the United States (Corrado
et al. 2009).
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seen as an unexpected bonus from the failure to establish a successful cor-
poratist model in an earlier generation. By the same token, the downside of
success based on corporate capitalism in the Golden Age is also apparent.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Growth accounting has been widely used by economic historians and some
important findings have emerged from the research of the past three decades.
First, it is clear that it is not generally the case that 7/8ths of labour productivity
growth comes from technical change and this famous result in Solow (1957)
now appears to be a bit of an outlier. Across other countries and in other time
periods, capital deepening accounts for rather more than 1/8th of labour pro-
ductivity growth. Moreover, particularly when Solow’s residual is big, technical
change only accounts for part of TFP growth while reductions in inefficiency
play an important part. Second, we now know that even really important new
technologies only have a small impact on productivity growth in the early days.
This was the message as long ago as the study of railroads by Fogel (1964), but
the weighting scheme inherent in growth accounting clarifies why this is the
case. ICT is historically remarkable and the Solow productivity paradox was a
mirage. Third, it is well worth considering to whom and how the benefits of new
technology accrue. This draws attention to the point that, in the medium term,
the users are typically the big gainers and that some of their consumer surplus
comes from the «new-good» attributes of the technology.
Economic historians have been right to emphasize the importance of what
Abramovitz and David (1996) called «social capability» and «technological
congruence» in understanding when countries are able to benefit from new
technology. Incentive structures are clearly central to understanding the devel-
opment and, much more importantly, the diffusion and effective assimilation of
new technologies. Given that the development of new technology is con-
centrated in relatively few countries and is influenced by its expected profit-
ability in the home market, it is perhaps not surprising that this technology is
sometimes «inappropriate» in other parts of the world. This is important for the
understanding of episodes both of falling behind and of rapidly catching up.
Moreover, the effective use of new technologies depends on institutions and it
must be acknowledged that the requirements of different technological eras are
not the same. As the post-war economic history of Europe shows, the policy
implications of this are important but not easy to address.
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